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Abstract: The related companies’ taxation has been a debatable issue for decades in the EU. Taxation
policies in the EU countries have been tried to be reconciled to the advantage of as many
member countries as possible in numerous tries. Although there has been a general trend of
income tax rates’ reduction in the last three decades, tax bases (and rates) still remain subject
to national tax legislations. The greatest advance in direct taxation harmonisation has been
achieved regarding the EU-headquartered multinational companies’ activities that are doing
business within the EU. Yet, the SME sector makes the majority of business activity in the
EU and small- and medium-sized companies’ networking is promulgated as a way of
building up the competitiveness in the Single market. As a prospective EU member country,
Croatia would have to adapt its taxation regulation according to the EU framework. Starting
from the current related companies’ taxation practices, this paper analyses the necessary
changes in Croatian legislation and questions what degree of fiscal autonomy could be
expected to remain regarding the related companies’ taxation practices in Croatia after the
EU joining.
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transactions, EU accession, Croatia
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Introduction
Since the independence declaration of the Republic of Croatia in 1992, many business
entities, formerly owned by the state have become privately owned. In line with the
ownership transition phase, there has also been a consolidation phase leading to the
(re)birth of business groups. However, the aim of this paper is neither to analyse the
origin of business groups’ formation in Croatia nor to investigate their longevity. It is
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concerned with purely regulatory defined taxation approach which might have
influenced the corporate management decisions to form a business group or help the
regulatory bodies estimate the size of fiscal revenues coming from the various
income taxes.
The taxation issue has been addressed in numerous papers and studies, especially
from the stance of the double taxation problem which refers to the taxation in the
source of income country and subsequent taxation in the destination of income
country, i.e. parent company country. Even though double taxation often exists at
both corporate and individual level, this paper deals only with the corporate taxation,
i.e. the taxation of corporate income of business groups whatever its source might be.
According to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) a business
group consists of at least two entities where one entity has more than 20% share in
another one and thus qualifies for the equity/proportionate consolidation method of
financial reporting. Business groups, in line with the IFRS practice, can be associated
companies, joint ventures or subsidiaries. The only difference the Standards make is
the level of control exacerbated through the ownership or voting rights of the parent
in a related company. But, from the taxation point of view, a business group is a set of
entities whose business results are consolidated on a group level. The letter approach
derives from the Anglo-American legal practice which admits only the groups where
one entity has a majority of ownership/voting rights in another one.
The concept of a tax group arose in the beginning of the XX century when it was
argued that in case of market competition between a commercial entity, organised as
a group of companies, and a commercial entity, organised as a single company, both
organisational entities should be treated the same way for tax purposes (Lamb, 1995,
p. 35). Still, until nowadays, a business group for accounting purposes is not treated
equally as a business group for the purposes of taxation. The former is also known as
an accounting group and it is often called business group while the letter is called the
taxation group. Another difference is that taxation rules are mandatory while
accounting policies, though also prescribed by the accounting standards and
sometimes determined by the law, are to some extent subject to the choice of
management. According to Hoogendoorn (1996), this fact is not surprising because
accounting and taxation have two opposite goals - the first one is concerned with the
wealth of shareholders while the letter one is concerned with paying as less taxes as
possible.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
international business group taxation practices, while Section 3 offers the taxation
practice review in Croatia. Section 4 deals with the European Union acquis regarding
business group taxation practice, while Section 5 estimates the impact of the EU
accession on business (group) taxation in Croatia. Last section concludes.
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Overview of Business Group Taxation Practices in the EU Member States
Taxation in general deals with transferring a part of profits earned in one jurisdiction
to the State budget of that jurisdiction. This can be reckoned as an off-balance sheet
debt of profit-making entity to the country and its citizens that (in)directly enabled its
profitable activities by means of legislative framework and infrastructure
preconditions. The home country, i. e. the country of the parent company would like
to tax the profits as much as the source-of-income country would. Due to differences
in size of tax rates, profit shifting between related companies often occurs and it can
take several forms, such as:
• companies locate their production – and therefore their profit – in low-tax
jurisdictions
• companies manipulate with the pricing of cross-border intra-group
transactions, what is particularly the case with the intangible assets whose price
is much harder to determine
• companies shift their debts into the jurisdictions with lower interest rates. In
most countries, interest payments are tax-deductible. Further, these payments
are subject to low, often zero, withholding tax rates and benefit from an
exemption or a tax credit system in the country of the company receiving the
interest payment.
The sooner the tax jurisdictions are aware of profit shifting activities, the better
their reaction. So, tens of bilateral double taxation avoidance agreements signed by
the same contractual party are not a surprise. When it comes to business group
income taxation and double taxation avoidance measures, several common issues,
which would be elaborated in more detail in the following subsections, might arise:
• home taxation vs. income at source taxation
• separate entity vs. group taxation
• tax loss carry-forward or carry-back
• double taxation relief for inter-corporate dividends and royalties
• tax anti-avoidance measures, i.e. transfer pricing rules.
Home Taxation vs. Income at Source Taxation
The prevailing taxation principle worldwide is that countries tax income earned
domestically, while home countries of parent companies tax worldwide income.
Although it the first impression might be that the source-of-income country is
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deprived for the part of tax revenues, especially if it lowers income tax rates to attract
the foreign capital, it in fact, can always find the way to preserve its taxation revenues
and prevent the double taxation. The trade-off between taxation revenues and foreign
capital attraction depends primarily on application of two methods - the credit
method and the exemption method. In addition, the expense deduction method
sporadically applies.
In credit method the home country calculates worldwide income and taxes
payable at the local tax rate. It then gives credit to the parent company for all taxes its
related entities paid abroad. Practically it means that the total taxes payable are
reduced by the nominal amount of taxes paid abroad. Tax credit can be recognised for
the full amount of taxes paid abroad or it can be limited up to the parent company
local tax rate. The justification for this method application is that no matter where
businesses operate, they should pay the same tax. Also, tax holidays benefit the
parent company country. This means that the tax allotted is totally neutral to capital
export (CEN principle).
The expense deduction method, though similar to the credit method, reverses the
calculation of taxes payable and tax credit. In this method worldwide income is
calculated and taxes paid abroad are deducted before local tax rate is applied. The
result is higher tax obligation in the parent country as compared to the tax obligation
under the credit method.
The exemption method supports the equal treatment of all investors in one
country. Before-tax income earned abroad is deducted in full from the worldwide
income of the parent company in its home country. It means that the group members
pay taxes only in the countries they earned their profit. The exemption method is
grounded on the capital import neutrality principle (CIN). However, the autonomy of
the source of income country is a threat for profit shifting between various tax
jurisdictions which leads to tax revenues losses (usually in the home country) due to
lower reported taxable income.
Table 1: Taxation allocation between source income country and home country
Type of method Source country Home country Worldwide Total
Expense deduction method
Income 20 30 50
Less deducted 6
Taxable income 44
Tax rate 30% 40% 40%
Tax 6 17,6 23,6
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Net income 26,4 26,4
Tax credit method (CEN)
Income 20 30 50
Tax rate 30% 40% 40%
Tax 6 20
Less tax credit (6)




Income 20 30 50
Less exempted 20
Taxable income 30
Tax rate 30% 40% 40%
Total tax paid 6 12 18
Net income 14 18 32
Source: Adopted according to Ashta, A., (2007), Double Taxation Avoidance: International and
Dividends.
The choice of the method is dependent on the goals of the parent company
country. The income exemption method is used by smaller countries with large
foreign markets, while large countries prefer to use the tax credit method to prevent
capital outflows. The confusing thing is that some countries use both CIN and CEN
principle under different circumstances. According to Ashta (2007), exemption
countries use income exemption method for taxing the income of active investors
(profits, inter-corporate dividends), while they apply tax credits for passive income
investors’ taxation (portfolio dividends and interest, royalty payments). The same
author points out that credit countries use tax credits for active investors’ income
taxation and income exemption method for inter-corporate dividends.
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Separate Entity vs. Group Taxation
Most often the countries that recognise business groups allow the business results
consolidation for tax purposes. Yet, the tax consolidation is in most tax jurisdictions
optional and permissible for tax residents only, with a prevailing question of what
share of ownership/voting rights one entity has to have in another one to qualify for
tax consolidation. Usually, it is more than 50%, but often it is even more than 90%.
The predominant concept of business group required for substantial group tax relief
is de jure control, ranging from 75-100% that is actually almost complete control
(Lamb, op. cit., p. 43). Traditionally, the countries that allow tax consolidation are
Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. The
allowance of tax consolidation usually relates to the tax consolidation of domestic
companies only, while the tax consolidation of both domestic and foreign
subsidiaries is rare in positive European practice (Denmark).
Some countries allow certain business entities to choose to be taxed either at the
group or at the separate level. But it is usually the case with small companies
established as limited liability companies and/or limited liability partnerships. When
taxation rules follow the accounting ones there are no temporary differences at all.1
Some experiences regarding the tax consolidation are illustrated in table 1.




Rules for fiscal consolidation / Special
allowance
Austria Yes If holding is > 50%
Belgium No -
Cyprus No Group losses relief if holding is > 75%
Czech R. No -
Denmark Yes
Only for 100% ownership share,
extendable to foreign subsidiaries.
Estonia No -
Finland Yes If holding is > 90%
France Yes
If holding is > 50%, extendable to foreign
subsidiaries
Germany Yes
For domestic companies only, if holding
is > 50%
Greece No -
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Hungary No -
Ireland No
Group losses relief possible if holding >
75%
Italy Yes
Both for domestic and worldwide
companies if holding > 50%
Latvia No
For domestic companies, EU-wide and
taxation treaties’ partners, group losses
relief possible if holding > 90%
Lithuania No -
Luxembourg Yes If holding is > 95%
Malta No
Group loss relief possible if holding is >
51%
The Netherlands Yes
For holding > 95%, extendable to foreign
companies under certain conditions.
Poland Yes If holding is > 95%
Portugal Yes If holding is > 90%
Slovakia No -
Slovenia Yes If holding is > 90%
Spain Yes If holding is > 75%
Sweden Yes If holding is > 90%
UK No
Group loss relief possible if holding >
75%
Source: Adapted according to Nicodeme, 2006.
Tax Loss Carry-Forward or Carry-Back
There are wide differences in treating intra-group losses for taxation purposes within
the EU which is a direct result of tax consolidation rules applied in the member states.
Apart from tax loss carry-forward or rarely carry-back possibility, the group loss
relief is existent in the UK and Ireland permitting a company to ‘surrender’ its loss to
another entity within the same business group.2 The proposal for a directive on the
cross-border relief in the EU was issued in 1991 (COM (1990) 595) but it was never
discussed by the European Council.
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Double Taxation Relief for Inter-Corporate Dividends and Royalty Fees
Even though the classical system of taxation consisting of the taxation at the level of
company and taxation at the shareholder level was internationally neutral, it
distinguished between equity and loan financing. In the first case both corporate
income and dividends are taxable, while interest is deductible from taxable income,
making the loan financing a cheaper option. (Ashta, 2007). Due to the critics of
double taxation, an integral systems of taxation emerged. The integration system of
taxation has the advantage of source of financing neutrality because income is taxed
only once, but it is not internationally neutral, especially as regards non-residents’
taxation. For double taxation relief (integration system) to apply, most countries
require a share ownership or voting rights threshold of 10-25% in domestically
related company. The relief can be full or partial. Apart from this, there are a couple
of ways to avoid double taxation of inter-corporate dividends. These are:
• Withholding tax = taxation at source = précompte mobiliar. The
source-of-income country withholds taxes on dividends distributed, usually
applying 5% to 25% rates.3 The net dividend is then (fully or partially) freed of
income tax in the parent company country.
• Tax credits = income exemption.
• Full exemptions of dividends paid. Only retained profits are taxed. It basically
means that dividends distribution is encouraged and that taxes paid in the parent
company country are lower. If there is no tax on dividends distributed in a
parent country, the whole distributed income is tax-exempt.
• Split rate system or partial exemption of dividends paid. Dividends distributed
are taxed at a lower rate than retained earnings (corporate income).
• Imputation credit = dividend franking credit = avoir fiscal. Dividend franking
credit is firstly added to the dividends declared amount, then corporate tax rate
is applied which is eventually reduced by the dividend franking credit. It
generally means that the shareholder is firstly credited with full or partial
corporate income tax amount, which is thereafter deducted from their tax
liability.4
Interest and royalty fee taxation usually goes side-by-side. These payments are
sometimes even more frequent than dividends, especially because they happen
throughout the year. Like dividends, interest and royalty fee tax is paid only once – as
revenue of the recipient in transactions between tax residents. Tax credit or
withholding tax normally applies in cross-border transactions, unless the taxation is
conducted according to bilateral double-taxation avoidance treaties. The treatment of
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inter-corporate dividends, interest and royalty fees in the EU member countries is
illustrated in table 3.
Table 3: Tax treatment of inter-corporate dividends, interest and royalty fees, and
transfer pricing rules in the EU member states for tax resident and tax
non-resident companies (without tax treaties provision and without P-S
















Interest Royalties Dividends Interest Royalties
Austria 25 25 20 OECD
Belgium 25 25 15 OECD
Cyprus 15 10 10 OECD
Czech Rep. 4:1 15 15 25 Yes
Denmark 28 4:1 28 30 OECD
Estonia 24 24 24 15 Yes
Finland 28 28 28 28 Yes
France 25 1,5:1 25 16 33,3 Yes
Germany 21,1 31,65 1,5:1 21,1 21,1 Yes
Greece 10 25 20 Yes
Hungary 3:1 OECD
Ireland 20 20 20 20 OECD
Italy 12,5 4:1 27 27 22,5 Yes
Latvia 5-15 4:1 10 5 5-15 Yes
Lithuania 15 0 15 4:1 15 10 10 OECD
Luxembourg 15 No
Malta 10 No
Netherlands 15 3:1 15 Yes
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Poland 19 3:1 19 20 20 OECD
Portugal 20 20 15 Yes
Slovak Rep. 19 19 19 Yes
Slovenia 15 25 15 15 Yes
Spain 3:1 15 15 25 OECD
Sweden 30 0 (28) OECD
UK 20 22 Yes
Source: Adapted according to Cnossen S., (2002), Coordinating Corporation Taxes in the European
Union: Subsidiarity in Action and Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides.
Tax Relief on Group Reorganisation
This relief was more or less available in the EU member countries even before the
adoption of Merger Directive that would be in more detail discussed in the next
section. Although the Merger Directive deals with cross-border reorganisations in the
Single market, some countries, like France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the UK, allow the deferral of tax on capital gains arising on domestic
intra-group transfers (Lamb, op. cit.).5
Some countries pay close attention to tax losses relief in case of business
reorganisations. For instance, in Belgium losses may be carried forward indefinitely
for tax purposes by the entity that has incurred the losses unless if control of company
changes. In the letter case, to prevent the sale of loss-making companies, there is a
thorough scrutiny if the change in control can be justified by legitimate financial and
economic needs.6
Tax Anti-Avoidance Measures
The term ‘tax anti-avoidance measures’ usually encompasses transfer pricing rules
and thin capitalisation rules. These are the two most often ways of tax evasion
conducted by multinational companies.
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations from 1995 and The OECD Model Convention on Income and on
Capital (MTC) from 2005, which serves as a model used by countries when
negotiating bilateral tax agreements, are a paradigm for transfer pricing rules
application for any tax jurisdiction dealing with such problems.7 OECD rules are
gradually gaining world-wide acceptance and are already adopted into legislation of
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many European countries, as is shown in table 3. There is an extensive monitoring on
transactional profit methods conducted by OECD that is a part of Transfer Pricing
Guidelines application surveillance. Although the arm’s length principle is a
cornerstone of transfer pricing methods, there are some other methods applied, that
are adopted in Croatian legislation as well.
Thin capitalisation rules are an attempt to restrict exaggerated transfer of income
through inter-corporate borrowings, by limiting the maximum debt-to-capital ratio.
But, these rules are more slowly finding their place in international taxation practice
as compared to general transfer pricing rules.
The Business Group Taxation in Croatia
The corporate income tax rate is 20% in Croatia. Resident companies pay tax on
worldwide income (CEN principle), with a credit for foreign tax paid. Non-resident
companies pay tax only on Croatian-source income (CIN principle). There are no
provisions on business group taxation, which means that each company, regardless of
being a member of a business group, submits the tax documentation and fulfils tax
obligations separately. However, for the purposes of transfer pricing rules’
application, the related company is defined as a company where the representatives
of a parent company either (in)directly participate in the Managing or Supervisory
board or exercise its interest through ownership share. The percentage of ownership
share is not defined in taxation regulation; therefore the definition from the Company
Law, which states that the controlling ownership share is necessary for determining
the relatedness between two companies, is applicable.8 Still, tax-loss carry-forward
rules apply only at the level of a single company for the next five years.
The tax base includes only operating expenditures for tax purposes, while
temporary differences arising from deferred liabilities are not recognised.9
Dividends received by resident shareholders are exempt from profit tax, while
there is no withholding tax on distributed income in the form of dividends to
non-resident companies. For the reimbursement of interest and royalties to foreign
parents, 15% interest and 15% royalty rate applies. However, the amount on tax
payable on inter-corporate distributed income can be reduced by tax treaties.10
Capital gains are subject to (20%) income tax.
Even though there are no special provisions on business restructurings’ taxation,
there is no real estate tax for the immovable assets transferred in business mergers or
divestitures.
In determining if market prices in inter-corporate transactions were accounted
(arm’s length principle), five methods are allowed as of the beginning of 2005. These
are Comparable Uncontrolled Price method (CUP), Cost Plus method (CP) and
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Resale Price method (RP) as traditional transfer pricing methods, while
Transactional Net Margin method (TNMM) and Profit Split method (PS) stand for
non-traditional transfer pricing methods. All of these methods are a part of OECD
transfer pricing rules. However, the practical usage of these methods as well as
transfer pricing control exercise by tax authorities is debatable, because the
relatedness between the companies is subject to tax authorities’ concern only upon
the demand of one of companies operating within a business group.
EU Directives Influencing Business Group Taxation
The direct taxation in the EU is, like all other regulations, enforced according to the
Single Market principles and the acquis of the Treaty on European Union. This
Single Market is based on the four basic freedoms, i.e. freedom of movement for
goods, services, labour and capital. Generally, the entire EU policy-making has been
tailored according to these four freedoms, ever since the Treaty of Rome was signed
in 1957.
At the early stages of the EU legislation creation in the 1960s and 1970s, there
were no attempts to harmonise direct corporate taxation. The idea of corporate
income tax convergence necessity emerged as M&A activities strengthened,
primarily within the scope of free movements of capital across the EU. The flow of
tax harmonisation drafts and their adoption by the EC Commission is well described
by Lamb (op. cit., p. 46-48).
The first laws concerning corporate tax harmonisation were passed in 1990,
primarily due to large differences in taxation regimes and business forms in the EU
member countries. The package of directives included Merger Directive,
Parent-Subsidiary (P-S) Directive, Transfer Pricing Arbitration Convention and five
more drafts. These directives were a step forward towards cross-border business
activities encouragement. A parallel trend of corporate income tax rates reduction
followed across the old-EU member states caused not only by the requirements of the
EU market broadening but also by a favourable business environments in
accelerating Asian economies. Some of the EU countries lowered the corporate
income tax rates for more than 20 percentage points in the 20-25 year period. Austria,
for instance, lowered its corporate income tax rate from 55% in the 1980ies to 25% in
2005, Finland did it from 59% to 26%, Ireland from 45% to 12,5% while the UK
reduced it from 52% to 30%. Consequently, the EU-15 average tax rate dropped from
40,4% in the 1990 to 30,4% in 2005 (Nicodème, 2006, p. 19).
The Code of Conduct for business taxation from 1998 was aimed to ban
discriminatory corporate tax policies by member states. It prevents member countries
from granting preferential tax regimes to only a subset of firms (typically,
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multinational enterprises) without according the same tax treatment to all firms
within its tax jurisdiction. However, this measure does not attempt to harmonise
either tax bases or corporate tax rates, both of which had been proposed in the Ruding
Report back in 1992.
The further progress emerged when the European Commission promulgated four
proposals for corporate income tax harmonisation in 2001, namely:
• an EU corporate tax rate (with full harmonization of rates and bases)
• a compulsory harmonized method to compute the tax base
• the same harmonised method to compute tax bases, which would be optional (a
Consolidated Common Tax Base) or
• the system of Home State Taxation in which all subsidiaries follow the same
taxation rules as their parent company wherever they are located, while the
source-of-income countries tax the income at their income tax rates. Most
supporters find it an appropriate way of the SME sector taxation, as there is no
need for SMEs to acquaint with the other countries’ tax rules.11
These proposals target the reduction of profit shifting, which primarily happens
within various tax jurisdictions where multinational companies operate. The
introduction of a consolidated company tax base and formula apportionment has
been still actively debated. However, the harmonisation of a tax base is very likely to
some extant. The idea is that profit shifting could be reduced by consolidating the
EU-wide profits of a multinational group applying a single tax base. The tax revenues
are then allocated among the countries in which the group operates according to a
pre-determined formula. Each EU member state would then apply its national tax rate
to the share of the overall tax base that is allocated to it. This procedure closely
follows the example of federal states with sub-national tax autonomy, such as the
United States, Canada or Switzerland.
While the four proposals on income taxation still exist only for the purposes of
discussion, some advances have been made regarding the related companies taxation
within the EU. Still, broad-based direct taxation harmonisation is hardly to expect to
happen because it does not have footing in the EC Treaty.12
With regard to multinational enterprises’ transactions’ taxation within the EU,
two directives adopted in 1990 were changed in 2003 and 2005 and an entirely new
directive for prevention of interest and royalty payments abuse was adopted in 2003.
So, the supranational EU regulatory framework for related companies’ taxation is as
follows.
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• Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive
90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (P-S Directive)
• Council Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005 amending Directive
90/434/EEC 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers,
divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of
different Member States (Merger Directive).
• Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation
applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated
companies of different Member States (I+R Directive).
The directives mentioned above apply only to the cross-border transactions
between related companies within the territory of the EU. They do not cover the
transactions of the EU enterprises with the companies outside the EU and they do not
rely on the transactions conducted between related companies within one EU
member state. Consequently, the EU member states keep the taxation freedom for
national and EU-international transactions.
There are some shareholding caps for the afore-mentioned directives application.
These are illustrated in table 4.
Table 4: Related companies’ lowest shareholding thresholds for the EU taxation
directives application
Implementation period P-S Directive Merger Directive I+R Directive
Until 31 December 2006 20% 20% 25%
From 1 January 2007 - 31 December 2008 15% 15% 25%
From 1 January 2009 thereon 10% 10% 25%
The EU member states can change the criterion of certain holding in a subsidiary’s
capital by means of a tax treaty while at the same time having the option of not
applying the directives if the uninterrupted holding period of a parent in a subsidiary
is shorter than two years.
The objective of the P-S Directive is to exempt dividends and other profit
distributions between subsidiary and parent companies from withholding taxes
within the EU and to eliminate double taxation of such income at the level of the
parent company. Provided that shareholding thresholds, as given in table 4 are
fulfilled, the parent company state should:
• refrain from taxing distributed profits from the subsidiary or
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• tax such profits while recognising the parent company the tax credit for taxes
paid in the subsidiary’s country of residence.
The P-S directive also applies when corporate groups are organised in chains of
companies and profits are distributed through the chain of subsidiaries to the parent
company. Each EU state can retain the option not to deduct any losses resulting from
the distribution of profits of the subsidiary to the parent company. Management fees
up to 5% of distributed profits can be deducted from the taxable profits of the parent
company.
The main objective of the Merger Directive is that taxation of the income, profits
and capital gains from business reorganisations should be deferred until a later
disposal of the assets provided that the transferred assets and liabilities remain
connected with the transferor. Although commonly known as Merger Directive, the
term reorganisation, except for mergers, includes full and partial divisions, transfers
of assets, exchanges of assets and transfer of the registered office from one member
state to another one without liquidation or dissolution. The latter condition is
applicable only for the transfer of registered office of enterprises registered as
European Company (SE) and European Cooperative Society (SCE).13 According to
the Directive, ‘where the assets transferred in a merger, a division, a partial division
or a transfer of assets include a permanent establishment of the transferring company
which is situated in a member state other than that of the transferring company, the
member state of the transferring company should renounce any right to tax that
permanent establishment. The member state of the transferring company may
reinstate in the taxable profits of that company such losses of the permanent
establishment as may previously have been set off against the taxable profits of the
company in that state and which have not been recovered’. Thus, the member states
taxing rights are safeguarded.
When it comes to assets transfer, only cash disbursed to the shareholders should
not exceed 10% of nominal value of transaction. In other words, Merger Directive
emphasises the importance of competitiveness build-up within the EU and treats
favourably the investments into the new member states.14 The Directive is in essence
the continuation of the Commission Recommendation from 1994 on the transfer of
small and medium-sized enterprises, which encouraged the Member States to take
the necessary measures to facilitate the transfer of small- and medium-sized
enterprises to ensure their survival and to safeguard the jobs that depend on them.
This directive called on waiving taxation on at least part of the revenue from capital
gains arising on the sale of assets of a business, providing tax incentives for the
reinvestment of the profits made on the sale of a business in another enterprise not
quoted on the stock exchange and reducing the taxation on the capital gain realised on
the transfer of the shares to employees.
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In line with provisions of I+R Directive, interest and royalty fees should be taxed
only once at the EU territory. In general, interest and royalty payments should be
exempt from any taxes in the country of transferor and taxed in the country of the
recipient. But it does not hold if payments are treated as a concealed distribution of
profit.
Transfer pricing is seriously tackled by the European Commission since the
European Commission report from 2001 wherein it was estimated that medium-sized
multinational enterprises spend approximately EUR 1 to EUR 2 million a year on
complying with transfer pricing rules, while large multinational enterprises incur
even higher expenditures ranging from EUR 4 up to EUR 5,5 million a year.15 The
European Commission established the Code of Conduct to standardize the
documentation that companies must provide to tax authorities on their pricing of
cross-border intra-group transactions in 2004 that favours the arm’s length principle
for transactions between related enterprises.16 The EU transfer pricing
documentation, (EU TPD), consists of two sets of standardised documents that a
multinational enterprise should submit to tax authorities. They are: the master-file (a
set of documentation containing common standardised information relevant for all
EU group members) and country-specific files. The use of EU TPD is optional for
multinational enterprises.
Transfer pricing will remain a widely discussed issue in the following years,
especially since Huizinga and Leaven (2005) estimated that aggregate loss in taxes
collected for European governments reach USD 2,7 billion a year due to substantial
profit shifting activities.17 Transfer Pricing Forum has been dealing with transfer
pricing problems in the EU since 2002.
The Implications of Changing Business Taxation Framework on Doing Business
in Croatia
The implications of changing business taxation framework have to be footed on the
prevailing size of the majority of enterprises in Croatia. Likewise other EU member
countries, the SME sector is dominant in Croatia. Over 99% of Croatian enterprises
belong to the SME sector, as is shown in table 5.
It is evident from the table 5 data that the total net income realised by Croatian
enterprises stood at 20,5 billion HRK (approximately 2,8 billion EUR) at the end of
2006. The largest enterprises participated with 11,9 billion HRK (58%) in aggregate
net income, while the medium-sized and small enterprises achieved 3,1 billion HRK
and 5,5 billion HRK, respectively. SMEs participated somewhat strongly in
corporate income tax collected as compared to large enterprises. With regard to
cross-border activities of Croatian enterprises, particularly the SMEs, there is no a
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statistical indicator, and this fact is even complicated with the fact that there is no
distinction between micro and small enterprises, as the letter would naturally be more
internationally present.
Table 5: SME sector activity in Croatia, 2006, in million HRK
Description Small Medium SMEs Large Total
Number of
enterprises
76.588 97.55% 1.480 1.89% 99.44% 441 0.56% 78.509
Number of
employees
388.275 44.84% 172.345 19.90% 64.75% 305.263 35.25% 865.883
Total revenues 197.513 33.30% 115.571 19.48% 52.78% 280.056 47.22% 593.140
Total
expenditures
189.631 33.48% 111.388 19.67% 53.15% 265.368 46.85% 566.387
Corporate
income tax
2.415 38.78% 1.077 17.30% 56.08% 2.735 43.92% 6.227
After-tax
income
11.194 35.97% 5.608 18.02% 53.99% 14.319 46.01% 31.121
After-tax loss 5.727 54.05% 2.501 23.61% 77.66% 2.367 22.34% 10.595
After-tax net
income
5.467 26.63% 3.107 15.14% 41.77% 11.952 58.23% 20.526
Source: FINA, 2007.
According to the European Commission Recommendation the threshold of
turnover or balance sheet assets for enterprises that qualify to be a part of the group of
small, medium or micro enterprises increased, as is evident from table 6, congruent
with the lessened thresholds of SME qualifiers adopted in the new Accounting Law
in Croatia.18 Needless to say, resident multinational enterprises are rare in Croatia.
Tax consolidation is not a mandatory option in the EU member states. Besides, the
tax treatment of business group deviates significantly from the accounting group
concept. As an accession country Croatia will have to adopt the directives regarding
related companies income taxation and to enforce stricter control of transfer pricing.
One argument in favour of stricter transfer pricing rules is that control of accounting
and taxation results lies with the same institution – the tax authority. Yet, the question
remains if the tax officials are capable of controlling related companies’ transactions,
especially when the subject of taxation are intangible assets whose comparables are
difficult to find even in more developed countries. It is therefore expected that much
attention in the EU would be dedicated to stricter transfer pricing regulation
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especially when having in mind the e-business increase worldwide. Croatia would
have to adapt its taxation legislation accordingly.


























< 250 = 50 million = 43 million = 35,37 million = 17.70 million
small < 50 = 10 million = 10 million = 8,85 million = 4.,42 million
micro < 10 = 2 million = 2 million not defined not defined
* Approximate calculations of Croatian kuna (HRK) thresholds into EUR amounts conducted by
applying 7,35 EURHRK rate
Source: SME definition in the EU, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm, and Croatian
Accounting Law.
The out-of-the-EU taxation regulation should be expected to remain within the
national tax regulations and double taxation avoidance treaties. Apart from transfer
pricing, direct tax harmonisation is not a feasible option in the near future, except for
unique taxation of companies belonging to the SME sector and tax base
harmonisation. The key supporting argument comes from the fact that the majority of
business entities in each EU member state are from the SME sector, so the smallest
resistance might be expected if parent company country tax base would be applied.
The other important supporting argument favouring the presumption that direct tax
harmonisation would neither be fast nor broad-based, is that there is no provision in
the EU law for direct tax harmonisation. Additionally, the directives that regulate the
issues that hampered the EU competitiveness growth at a large scale are already
adopted.
The only argument in favour of direct taxation harmonisation is the threat of
impinging any of the four freedoms of movement in the common market, which in
most part remains neutralised after the multinational companies’ transactions
regulation. The point is that some part of related companies’ transactions and their
respective income always remains non-taxable, as it is impossible to follow the
thousands of transactions, not only within related companies but within related
companies’ and their business partners that serve as a means of deliberate hiding of
the part of profit on the basis of reciprocity.
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Conclusion
The introduction of business group taxation in Croatian taxation system could
become a serious subject in the accession process to the EU. However, the significant
business group taxation implementation and monitoring problem would arise after
the EU joining. Especially, the transfer pricing problem could become the hot issue in
the next decade throughout the EU due to the large amount of tax revenues lost in
cross-border tax evasion within the EU member states.
Even though there are continuous debates on direct taxation harmonisation,
Croatia can be indifferent towards them as the most likely Home State Taxation or tax
base harmonisation would not affect it to a large extent. One reason is that most
Croatian companies belong to SMEs, which have limited cross-border activities. The
other, more prevailing argument is that the Croatian corporate income tax base
calculation is significantly synchronised with most EU countries’ practices. The only
area that Croatia lags behind the EU countries is inexistence of tax consolidation
possibility for domestic related companies. However, most European countries
permit tax consolidation only theoretically. Therefore, fiscal freedom would
probably remain within the national taxation jurisdiction for domestic business
groups and domestic enterprises in general in the foreseeable future. However, as
taxation legislation of the EU converges with the OECD and vice versa, it would be
interesting to follow both legislative frameworks in the years to come, as well as to
monitor the new-EU countries experiences regarding the multinational enterprises’
activities’ monitoring for income taxation purposes.
NOTES
1 Temporary differences stem from the difference between the accounting basis and the tax basis of the
corporate income, i.e. deferred taxation. The main reasons of temporary differences are different
accounting and tax treatment of depreciation, inventories, provisions, interest expenses, R&D costs and
similar items.
2 Interestingly, some EU member states offer indefinite tax loss carry-forward possibility, such as
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, but
most have restrictions in case of change of control (for details see Blaiæ, 2006, pp. 201-205).
3 Withholding tax is often wrongly considered as an equivalent to the imputation tax (= advance tax =
equalization tax = précompte) which is a mark for dividends paid in arrears.
4 For various inter-corporate dividend taxation methods in the old-EU member states, see Blaiæ, 2006,
p. 169.
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5 According to the same author, some EU member states, such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain, also allow deferral of tax on unrealised intra-group trading profits in addition to
classical consolidation rules.
6 Deloitte International Tax and Business Guide - Belgium, June 2007,
http://www.deloittewebguides.com/report_dl.asp?mode=pdf&issue_id=1862284571.
7 Transfer Pricing Country Profiles of OECD countries are available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_33753_37837401_1_1_1_1,00.html.
8 See Article 473 of the Croatian Company Law.
9 The calculation of accounting income includes permanent as well as temporary differences.
10 Croatia signed 45 bilateral double-taxation avoidance treaties. Most of them are agreements with the
major trade partners, like the countries from former Yugoslavia and the EU member countries.
11 See COM(2001) 582 final. About 99% of the EU enterprises belong to the SME sector. An EU
Observatory survey on SMEs' activities is regularly conducted, with the last one completed in 2007 after
carrying out more than 17 thousand European enterprises. Its results showed astonishingly low
cross-border activity of the SMEs. For example, only 8% of the EU SMEs reported turnover from
exports, while only 5% reported that they have subsidiaries or joint ventures abroad.
12 The most closely related article of the EC Treaty on the issue of direct taxes harmonisation is given in
the Article No 94 stating that "The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the
Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market".
13 With the possibility of enterprises registration as SE and SCE, the business networking within the EU
is facilitated. Only companies may hold shares in an SE, whose minimum capital must be 120.000 EUR.
An SE is automatically equated to a public limited liability company in the member state where it has its
head office and is subject to the tax laws of the country in which it is registered. Unlike SE, both physical
persons and business entities can set up an SCE by subscribing at least 30.000 EUR of capital. Their
liabilities are limited to the size of the subscribed capital. For more details see the Regulation (EC) No
2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE) and the Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the
Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE).
14 The OECD approved of a mandate for the Working Group of business restructurings in 2007,
following the steps of the Merger Directive.
15 See European Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM(2001) 582 final.
16 The Code effectively implements the EU Arbitration Convention which was originally proposed in
1976 and signed in 1990. The follow-up of the Code of Conduct was the Code of Conduct for the
effective implementation of the Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the
adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, issued in 2006.
17 Information taken from Nicod?me G., 2006.
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18 See Official Gazzette of the RC, No 109/2007.
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